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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization has come to financial markets and to innumerable industries.
U.S. businesses routinely export and import goods and products; indeed,
many have done so for decades. Domestic companies that sell materials
online almost certainly do some international business. Many American
corporations have foreign facilities or operations, while others operate in
foreign countries intermittently. Individuals travel internationally with
relative ease. For Americans living in states that adjoin Canada or Mexico,
international travel can be accomplished simply by driving across the border.
*
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At the same time, insurance policies sold in the United States frequently
contain territorial limitations on coverage that superficially seem out of
place when compared to many aspects of modern business and to individual
habits or practices. The concept of globalization is, in many instances,
missing from the pages of insurance policies, or is, at the very least,
significantly circumscribed. For example, a standard commercial general
liability (CGL) insurance policy provides that it “applies to ‘bodily injury’
and ‘property damage’ only if . . . [t]he ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’
is caused by an ‘occurrence’ that takes place in the ‘coverage territory.’”1 A
standard CGL policy defines “coverage territory” as:
a. The United States of America (including its territories and
possessions), Puerto Rico and Canada;
b. International waters or airspace, but only if the injury or
damage occurs in the course of travel or transportation between
any places included in Paragraph a. above; or
c. All other parts of the world if the injury or damage arises out
of:
1. Goods or products made or sold by you in the territory
described in Paragraph a. above;
2. The activities of a person whose home is in the territory
described in Paragraph a. above, but is away for a short
time on your business; or
3. “Personal and advertising injury” offenses that take
place through the Internet or similar electronic means of
communication;
provided the insured’s responsibility to pay damages is determined
in a “suit” on the merits, in the territory described in Paragraph a.
above or in a settlement [the insurer] agree[s] to.2
To use another example, a standard personal auto policy provides that
it “applies only to accidents and losses which occur . . . [w]ithin the policy
territory.”3 “The policy territory is: [t]he United States of America, its
territories or possessions,” Puerto Rico, and Canada.4 “The policy also
1. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM 1
(2012), https://www.northstarmutual.com/UserFiles/Documents/forms/policyforms/Current/
CG%2000%2001%2004%2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU2H-RF7W].
2. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
3. ISO P ROPS ., I NC ., P ERSONAL A UTO P OLICY 12 (2003), https://www.leland
west.com/images/pp00010105.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ8N-CR2S].
4. Id. Some insurance companies will extend the territory for some auto
coverages to Mexico within a specified distance of the United States border. See, e.g.,
Quevillon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 501 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding a territorial limitation which provided that “[t]he liability, medical payments
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applies to loss to, or accidents involving, ‘[the named insured’s] covered
auto’ while being transported between their ports.”5 Other policies may
impose additional types of territorial limitations.6 A policy that provides
worldwide coverage for certain occurrences may nonetheless validly require
that a suit against the insured be brought in the United States or its
territories or possessions, Canada, or Puerto Rico for the insurer to have a
duty to defend or indemnify the insured.7
Insurers territorially limit their coverages for rating purposes.8 Courts
generally enforce geographic restrictions in insurance policies.9 But they

and physical damage coverages also apply in Mexico within 50 miles of the United States
border”).
5. ISO PROPS., INC., supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Gonzalez, 637 F. App’x 812, 813 (5th Cir. 2016)
(involving an insurance policy that covered one tractor-trailer and had a 100-mile radius
of operation; the tractor-trailer was involved in an accident approximately 190 miles from
the insured’s base of operation, and thus outside the coverage territory); Stratford Ins. Co.
v. Cooley, 985 F. Supp. 665, 667–68 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (upholding a 50-mile radius
limitation endorsement to a trucker’s liability insurance policy); Mendez v. Brites, 849
A.2d 329, 334–40 (R.I. 2004) (enforcing a provision in an auto policy issued to a
Massachusetts resident, in Massachusetts, for a vehicle registered and garaged in
Massachusetts, that stated in the compulsory insurance section that the insurer would “pay
damages to people injured or killed by your auto in Massachusetts accidents” (emphasis
omitted)).
7. See, e.g., Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Marin Mountain Bikes, Inc., No. C115193CW, 2012 WL 3945531, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (applying California law
and upholding such a provision); see also, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Sovereign Gen. Ins.
Servs., Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 600 (Ct. App. 2006) (Hull, J., concurring) (“Indeed, it
would be entirely understandable for an insurance company to want to limit the coverage
of its policy to actions prosecuted only in particular jurisdictions and not want to obligate
itself to the defense of claims in foreign jurisdictions having different laws and different
legal systems. There is no reason why an unambiguous clause limiting coverage in that
manner should not, as a matter of contract, be enforceable.”).
8. “Rating” refers to the process of determining the premium to be charged to
insure a risk. Rating, IRMI, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/rating
[https://perma.cc/J34R-9VSU].
9. Lane Finch, Automobile Liability Insurance, in 6 N EW A PPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 63.01, § 63.09 (Jeffrey E. Thomas & Christopher J.
Robinette eds., 2018); see, e.g., Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 601 S.E.2d 645,
647 (Va. 2004) (explaining the reasonableness of a territorial limitation on medical
expense coverage in an auto policy); Werner’s Inc. v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 477
N.W.2d 868, 871 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (articulating the public policy reasons for
enforcing a territorial restriction in an auto policy); Quevillon, 501 N.W.2d at 857–58
(rejecting the insured’s argument that the territorial limitation provision in an auto policy
was ambiguous).
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do not always do so,10 and territorial limitations may, in any event, be a
source of unpleasant surprises for insureds who, for one reason or another,
thought they had coverage for an occurrence only to learn they were
uninsured by virtue of an accident’s location.11 Territorial limitations may
also pose analytical challenges for courts and lawyers in cases that involve
allegedly tortious conduct that occurred both within and outside the specified
coverage territory. Perhaps surprisingly, coverage territory clauses may
frustrate insurers by potentially subjecting them to personal jurisdiction in
remote or unfamiliar forums.
This Article examines the key issues raised by territorial limitations on
insurance coverage. Part II begins the examination with discussions of
three essential territorial limitation issues: (a) the so-called place-of-injury
test for triggering coverage; (b) the short time exception to territorial
limitations on coverage; and (c) the availability of coverage for accidents
or losses that occur between the ports of countries within a policy’s coverage
territory. Part III explores territorial limitations on uninsured motorist
coverage in automobile insurance policies. Although courts generally
enforce territorial limitations in auto policies, they may not do so where
the policy in question imposes a more restrictive territorial limitation on
uninsured motorist coverage than it does on other coverages, or where the
state’s uninsured motorist statute does not contemplate a territorial
limitation on this type of coverage. Finally, Part IV addresses the personal
jurisdiction ramifications for insurers that arise out of coverage territory
provisions. In a nutshell, a policy’s coverage territory provision may create
the minimum contacts required for specific personal jurisdiction over the
insurer in a forum that is within the specified territory. If so, the insurer
will have to establish that it would be unreasonable for a court in the forum
state to exercise personal jurisdiction if it does not want to litigate the

10. See, e.g., Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Scanray Corp., No. CV-885065-KB, 1992 WL 104797, at *3–5 (9th Cir. May 18, 1992) (concluding that the
territorial limitation was ambiguous); Sapp v. Canal Ins. Co., 706 S.E.2d 644, 649 (Ga.
2011) (“[A]ny provisions in the insurance policy . . . that would serve to reduce or negate
Canal’s obligations . . . under the [Motor Carrier] Act are void and of no effect. . . . The
radius-of-use limitation, which purports to exclude from coverage any incident occurring
more than 50 miles from Tifton, Georgia, is such a provision and is, therefore,
unenforceable.” (citations omitted)); see also Werner’s, 477 N.W.2d at 872 (“[C]ourts
have not enforced territorial restrictions on specific areas of coverage, when those
limitations were more restrictive than on other areas of coverage within the same
policy.”).
11. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 637 F. App’x at 813–14, 817 (finding for the insurer where,
a few months prior to an accident 190 miles from its base of operations, the insured asked
its broker about increasing its covered radius of operations from 100 to 300 miles, and,
based on the broker’s alleged representations and a premium increase, thought it had
acquired expanded coverage).
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related controversy there. The existence of personal jurisdiction is always
a case- and fact-specific inquiry.
II. ESSENTIAL CONTOURS OF TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS ON
COVERAGE
A. The Place-of-Injury Test
As territorial limitations in insurance policies make clear, the existence of
an occurrence in the coverage territory is a condition of coverage. This
seemingly simple requirement can be controversial in cases that involve
allegedly tortious conduct that took place both within and outside the
coverage territory. In this recurring situation, courts typically focus on
the location of the accident that gave rise to the injury or harm at issue.12
Under the so-called place-of-injury test, “the final event in a chain of acts
or omissions that culminates in the injury itself must be within the policy’s

12. See, e.g., ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. RC2 Corp., 600 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“[U]nder Illinois law and unless a particular policy contemplates a different definition, an
accident occurs when and where all the factors come together at once to produce the force
that inflicts injury and not where some antecedent negligent act takes place.”); CACI Int’l,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 157 (4th Cir. 2009) (calling the place
of injury “controlling” when evaluating whether an occurrence was within the coverage
territory); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. De La Luz Garcia, 501 F.3d 436, 442–43 (5th Cir.
2007) (involving an MCS-90B endorsement and an accident in Mexico); Lincoln Gen. Ins.
Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that there was no coverage
for a bus accident in Mexico, which was outside the coverage territory, even though the
insured was alleged to have negligently hired, trained, and supervised the bus driver in
Texas, which was within the policy’s coverage territory); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Globe
Int’l Ministries, Inc., No. 3:14cv150/MCR/ CJK, 2015 WL 11110847, at *5 (N.D. Fla.
Sept. 26, 2015) (applying Florida law and focusing on “the immediate injury-producing
act”); Christian World Adoption, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 2:11-cv-831–RMG,
2012 WL 13005336, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2012) (applying South Carolina law in a case
in which the pleadings made clear that the injury occurred outside the policy’s “coverage
territory”); Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 988 N.E.2d 897, 903
(Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (reasoning that the underlying occurrences were outside the
coverage territory based on the location of “the events that inflicted the harm alleged”);
Keystone Automated Equip. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 535 A.2d 648, 652–53 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (stating that when deciding whether an occurrence is within a policy’s coverage
territory, “the occurrence giving rise to liability is the actual injury to the person or the
property”); see also Indus. Indem. Co. v. Apple Comput., Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528,
542–44 (Ct. App. 1999) (distinguishing between the planning and commission of an
advertising injury offense for purposes of coverage territory analysis).
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coverage territory” to trigger coverage.13 Said another way, it is the
location of the injury itself rather than “some precipitating cause” that
determines whether an occurrence is within a policy’s coverage territory.14
This is the correct approach. If courts instead applied a cause test, for
example, plaintiffs could “sweep any number of worldwide events into
the ambit of a domestic policy,” insurance companies would become liable
for losses for which they did not contract or charge premiums, global insurance
policies would be redundant, and territorial limitations on coverage would
be meaningless.15 As the Virginia Supreme Court similarly reasoned in
enforcing a territorial limitation in an automobile insurance policy:
[A]n insurance company measures the actuarial risk for its policies by experience and
data collected within the area for which coverage is contractually bound . . . and
not by the wide variations found in foreign countries. The premium the insured
contracts to pay for the policy coverage is based on that actuarial risk assumed
by the insurer under the terms of the insurance contract. The premium payment
and coverage terms of the contract between the insurer and insured are fundamentally
based on these identifiable risks. It would be manifestly unreasonable to
alter the terms of the insurance contract by judicial fiat and arbitrarily add to the
policy additional and unmeasured insurance risks involved for driving in [a]
foreign country or territory which is not a part of the insurance contract.16

Lincoln General Insurance Co. v. Reyna is a representative place-ofinjury case.17 Reyna arose out of a collision between a bus owned by Cesar
Reyna and driven by his employee, Joel Lozano, and another vehicle.18
The wreck occurred in Mexico.19 Two people in the other vehicle were
killed, and their relatives sued Reyna in a Texas state court.20 Lincoln
General insured Reyna under a business auto policy.21 Lincoln General
denied coverage for the accident and correspondingly declined to defend

13. Walter J. Andrews & Matthew McLellan, The Long Arm and Short Leash for
Coverage Territory Clauses, LAW360 (May 13, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/653547/print?=insurance.
14. CACI Int’l, 566 F.3d at 157; see also ACE American, 600 F.3d at 769–70
(“[T]he ‘occurrence’ that triggers coverage takes place where the actual event that inflicts
harm takes place. . . . [A]n accident occurs when and where all the factors come together
at once to produce the force that inflicts injury and not where some antecedent negligent
act takes place.”).
15. CACI Int’l, 566 F.3d at 157.
16. Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 601 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Va. 2004); see
also Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1166–67 (D. Haw. 2001)
(explaining the economic importance of, and public policy reasons for, territorial
restrictions in connection with uninsured motorist coverage).
17. See generally 401 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2005).
18. Id. at 349.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Reyna in the state court action.22 After the plaintiffs obtained a default
judgment against Reyna, Lincoln General filed a declaratory judgment
action in a Texas federal court in which it sought a determination that it
did not owe coverage for the action and, consequently, that it had no duty
to defend Reyna.23 Lincoln General won summary judgment in the district
court, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit.24 On appeal, they had
to find a way to skirt the territorial restrictions in the Lincoln General
policy because Mexico was clearly outside the policy’s coverage territory.25
In an effort to do so, they argued that regardless of whether the bus crash
occurred in Mexico, Lincoln General had a duty to defend Reyna because
he negligently hired, trained, and supervised Lozano in Texas, which was
within the policy’s coverage territory.26 They further contended that
Reyna’s actions in Texas qualified as an “accident” under Lincoln General’s
policy.27 Lincoln General responded that because the bus crash occurred
in Mexico, and thus outside the coverage territory, it could have had no
duty to indemnify Reyna; therefore, it was not required to defend him.28
The Reyna court sided with Lincoln General. It was undisputed that the
bus wreck occurred in Mexico.29 The policy clearly provided that Mexico
was not part of the coverage territory.30 Reyna’s alleged negligence would
not have existed but for the bus wreck in Mexico.31 It was irrelevant to the
court that Reyna’s allegedly negligent conduct took place in Texas “because
the cause of action against him [arose] out of the bus crash in Mexico
which [did] not fall within the [policy’s] coverage provisions.”32
Applying Texas law, the court concluded that under the “eight corners
rule”33 Lincoln General had no duty to defend Reyna because the only
facts alleged—as compared to claims asserted—were excluded from
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 354.
26. Id. at 351.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 354.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 354–55.
33. As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he eight-corners rule provides
that when an insured is sued by a third party, the liability insurer is to determine its duty
to defend solely from terms of the policy and the pleadings of the third-party claimant.”
GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex. 2006).
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coverage.34 Accordingly, the Reyna court affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Lincoln General.35
The court in Chiquita Brands International, Inc. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co. reached a similar result.36 In that case, Chiquita sought
a declaration that National Union had a duty to defend it in numerous
cases filed in the United States arising out of kidnappings, murders,
torture, and other atrocities committed by terrorist groups in Colombia.37
The plaintiffs in the underlying tort litigation alleged that Chiquita aided
and abetted and conspired with the terrorist groups.38 National Union
declined to defend Chiquita in part because its policies stated that it would
pay for damages caused by an occurrence in the “coverage territory” and
defined the coverage territory “as ‘[t]he United States of America (including
its territories and possessions), Puerto Rico and Canada.’”39 As National
Union pointed out, all of the harm for which Chiquita faced potential liability
occurred in Colombia, which was plainly outside the policies’ coverage
territory.40 The trial court, however, held that the occurrences triggering
coverage were within the coverage territory because “the decision to pay
the terrorist groups was made at Chiquita’s corporate headquarters in
Cincinnati, Ohio. The employees in Col[o]mbia simply implemented that
policy with the goal of protecting Chiquita’s employees and property.”41
National Union appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals.
The Chiquita court rejected the trial court’s conclusion.42 The court
could locate no controlling Ohio authority but observed that “the ‘great
weight of case law’ from other jurisdictions holds that ‘it is the location
of the injury—not some precipitating cause—that determines the location of
the event for purposes of insurance coverage.’”43 The court embraced this
line of authority.44 As the court noted, the events that caused the harms
alleged in the underlying cases occurred in Colombia; Chiquita’s decision to
pay the terrorists in an effort to buy peace for its Colombian employees
and operations “was merely a precipitating event.”45 As a result, there
were no “occurrences” in the United States, which was the relevant
34. Reyna, 401 F.3d at 355 (citing Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc.,
363 F.3d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 2004)).
35. Id.
36. See generally 988 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
37. Id. at 898–99, 901.
38. Id. at 901.
39. Id. at 902 (quoting the National Union policies).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. RC2 Corp., 600 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2010)).
44. Id. at 903.
45. Id.
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coverage territory.46 National Union, therefore, had no duty to defend
Chiquita in the underlying litigation.47 The court consequently reversed
the trial court judgment for Chiquita and remanded the case “to the trial
court to enter judgment in favor of National Union.”48
ACE American Insurance Co. v. RC2 Corp. is an interesting case
because the insured, RC2, had both domestic and international CGL
policies, but unfortunately found that its belt-and-suspenders approach to
insuring against product liability risk still left it exposed.49 RC2
manufactured wooden toys in China.50 When it had to recall some of its
toy trains because they were decorated with lead paint, numerous
plaintiffs filed class actions alleging that RC2 negligently manufactured
and tested the toys.51 All of the suits involved toys that were sold and used
exclusively in the United States.52 RC2 had two lines of CGL coverage: one
set of policies covered occurrences in the United States; the second set,
which was issued by ACE, applied internationally but excluded from
coverage occurrences within the United States.53 RC2’s domestic insurer
denied coverage for the class actions based on lead paint exclusions in its
policies.54 That left the ACE policies as RC2’s only potential source of
protection.55 But ACE denied coverage on the basis that the occurrences at
issue took place in the United States.56 ACE simultaneously filed a
declaratory judgment action in an Illinois federal court in an attempt to
establish that it had no duty to defend or indemnify RC2.57
The ACE policies provided that for coverage to apply, the “occurrence” at
issue had to take place in the coverage territory, which included “anywhere
in the world” except “the United States of America (including its territories
and possessions).”58 The parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment, and the district court ruled that ACE had a duty to defend RC2

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 904.
See generally 600 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 765.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763, 765.
Id. at 765–66 (quoting the ACE policies).
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because the toys had been negligently manufactured in China, which was,
by definition, within the policies’ coverage territory.59 The district court
awarded RC2 just over $1.6 million in defense costs plus interest.60 ACE
and RC2 settled the latter’s claim for indemnity, and the district court
dismissed that part of the case.61 ACE then appealed the district court’s
conclusion that it was obligated to defend RC2 to the Seventh Circuit.62
The Seventh Circuit observed that the resolution of the case turned “on
whether, under the policies, an ‘occurrence’ takes place at the time and at
the location where any antecedent negligent acts took place.”63 ACE
argued that under controlling Illinois law, “the occurrence took place in
the United States, where [consumers] were exposed to the lead paint.”64
RC2 countered that any “occurrence” took place in China, where the toys
were negligently manufactured and tested.65 According to RC2, this was
because the acts that caused the plaintiffs’ harm occurred in China.66
The ACE American court rejected RC2’s theory that the occurrences
that triggered ACE’s duty to defend took place in China and thus were
within the coverage territory because that is where the “antecedent
negligent acts” were performed.67 In the court’s eyes, the ACE policies
clearly established that an “‘occurrence’ that triggers coverage takes place
where the actual event that inflicts the harm takes place.”68 As the court
would later reiterate, absent contrary policy language, “an accident occurs
when and where all the factors come together at once to produce the force
that inflicts injury and not where some antecedent negligent act takes
place.”69 There were sound reasons for this rule:
Because we hold that the insurance policies unambiguously exclude coverage . . .
we need not rely on extrinsic factors to determine the intent of the parties in
entering the agreements. But we note that the construction urged by RC2 would
render the domestic and international policies in this case almost entirely
redundant. And because these policies use standard language, this construction
would make territorial limitations in insurance policies largely irrelevant in
product liability situations. Most product liability claims will at least potentially
be caused by negligent acts that allegedly occur both domestically and abroad; an
insurance company’s duty to defend would thus almost invariably be triggered in any
products liability case, regardless of where the injury happened. The only reason

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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that lead-paint exposure was not covered by the domestic policies was an
express exclusion in those policies. Indeed, RC2’s own conduct in first submitting its
claims . . . to its domestic insurer was entirely consistent with our holding.
Moreover, it would have made little sense for RC2 to take out both international
and domestic policies if its primary risk for liability would be covered under both
policies.70

Because the occurrences at issue took place outside the coverage territory and
thus did not even potentially implicate ACE’s duty to indemnify RC2,
ACE had no duty to defend RC2 in the underlying litigation.71 The
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the
case with instructions to enter judgment for ACE.72
Barry v. Cincinnati Insurance Cos.73 merits discussion because of the
particular territorial limitation at issue. In Barry, Mohamed Barry was
killed in a car accident in Africa.74 His widow, Kathleen Gibbons-Barry,
sought uninsured motorist (UM) coverage under the couple’s policy with
the Cincinnati Insurance Companies.75 The territorial limitation in the
Cincinnati policy stated that coverage “applie[d] only to accidents and
losses” that occurred in the coverage territory.76 The coverage territory
was the familiar combination of the United States, including its territories and
possessions, Canada, and Puerto Rico.77 Gibbons-Barry argued that
coverage attached because, while the accident occurred in Africa and thus
outside the Cincinnati policy’s coverage territory, the “losses” from the
accident occurred in the United States.78 To put a finer point on her
argument, she reasoned that “her ‘losses’ [were] covered by the policy
because she suffered financial detriment caused by her husband’s death
while residing in the United States.”79 The Barry court disagreed.80
Interpretation of the territorial limitation did not pivot on the term
“losses,” as Gibbons-Barry contended, but instead on the conjunction
“and.”81 Giving the phrase “accidents and losses” plain and ordinary
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 769–70.
Id. at 770.
Id.
See generally No. 01AP-1437, 2002 WL 31087264 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2002).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2 (quoting the policy).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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meaning, the territorial limitation provided that the policy would not
apply unless both the accident and the resulting losses occurred in the
coverage territory.82 Gibbons-Barry’s urged interpretation of the policy
confused the conjunctive “and” with the disjunctive “or.”83 In short,
because her husband’s fatal accident occurred outside the Cincinnati
policy’s coverage territory, the plaintiff could not recover.84
In conclusion, courts properly use the place-of-injury test to determine
whether an occurrence took place in a policy’s coverage territory. The
“cause” test, which courts generally use to determine the number of
occurrences under a liability insurance policy,85 is irrelevant to the location
of an occurrence.86 Indeed, use of a cause test in the coverage territory
context would make it impossible as a practical matter for insurers to
accurately underwrite and price their policies.87
B. The Short Time Exception to Territorial Limitations on Coverage
As place-of-injury cases demonstrate, territorial limitations on coverage
impose important conditions on insurers’ duties to their insureds. They
also create potential practical difficulties for commercial insureds with
occasional or intermittent foreign operations or engagements. Consider,
for example, a company that sells a product to a purchaser in a country
that is outside the coverage territory of the company’s CGL policy and
must then dispatch an employee to install or service the product or train
the purchaser’s employees in the product’s use. As brief or irregular as
this trip may be, it nonetheless places the employee outside the company’s
insurance coverage territory and exposes the company to uninsured vicarious
liability if the employee commits a tort on the trip. To account for this
possibility, some business insurance policies include a “short time exception”
to territorial limitations on coverage. For example, a standard CGL policy
that defines the coverage territory as the United States, its territories and
possessions, Puerto Rico, and Canada states that it will apply to an
“occurrence” in “[a]ll other parts of the world if the injury or damage
arises out of . . . [t]he activities of a person whose home is in the [coverage]
territory . . . but is away for a short time on [the named insured’s] business.”88
So what is a short time in this context? There is no uniform answer.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 454 (6th ed. 2018).
86. See ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. RC2 Corp., 600 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2010))
87. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
88. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 1, at 1, 13.
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Giving the phrase a short time its customary and ordinary meaning, it
“most naturally covers a brief, discrete event such as a several-day
business trip abroad.”89 In comparison, a trip or stay of several weeks or
longer is not a short time for territorial limitation purposes.90 If an insured
plans to have a systematic or continuous presence in a country that is
outside its policy’s coverage territory, it cannot exploit the short time
exception by rotating employees in and out of that location, by requiring
an employee to work there for short periods on a regular or recurring basis,
or the like.91 To allow such practices would result in the short time
exception swallowing the policy’s territorial limitation whole.92 Rather, a
business with sustained foreign operations that does not have or want a
global insurance policy may need to explore an endorsement to its CGL
or other policy that expands the coverage territory to scheduled countries
or makes coverage worldwide.93
C. Losses or Accidents Between Ports
Standard automobile insurance policies do not include a short time exception,
but they do extend coverage “to loss[es] to, or accidents involving,” insureds’
covered autos “while being transported between their ports.”94 “Their” in
this phrase refers to the “United States, its territories and possessions,” Puerto
Rico, or Canada.95 Absent specific definitional language in a policy, “port”
89. CACI Int’l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 158 (4th Cir.
2009); see also Amor Ministries v. Century Sur. Co., No. 13-CV-1441 W (BGS), 2014
WL 12167640, at *1, *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014) (implying that an injured church
volunteer’s three-day religious mission was a short time for coverage territory purposes).
90. CACI Int’l, 566 F.3d at 158.
91. See id. at 159 (rejecting the insured’s argument that the short time exception
applied to its extended operations in Iraq).
92. Id. (“The term ‘short time’ has a plain and ordinary meaning, and the complaints
allege a systematic pattern of activities lasting months and even years. . . . [W]e are not
permitted to take such a massive operation and cram it into a short time exception. If we
did so, the exception would swallow the policies’ coverage provisions whole . . . .”).
93. See Donald S. Malecki, Strangers in a Strange Land: Avoid Coverage Shortcuts
Where Short-Term Foreign Liability Is Concerned, ROUGH NOTES CO., http://www.roughnotes.
com/rnagazine/2010/july2010/2010_07p082.htm [https://perma.cc/EW3A-6U76] (making this
suggestion and identifying three standard endorsements that expand a CGL policy’s
coverage territory). This observation does not constitute legal advice.
94. ISO PROPS., INC., supra note 3, at 12.
95. Id. Similarly, a standard CGL policy defines “coverage territory” to mean
“[i]nternational waters or airspace, but only if the injury or damage occurs in the course of
travel or transportation between any places included in” the United States of America
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refers to “a seaport or other place” in a covered country, such as an airport,
from which it is possible to travel on or over international waters, or
through international airspace.96 If an insured airplane was being flown
from Florida to Puerto Rico, for example, the departure and destination
airports would be ports for coverage territory purposes.97 In contrast, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection ports of entry along the borders between
the United States and Mexico and the United States and Canada are not ports
within the meaning of auto insurance policies’ coverage territory provisions.98
Ruiz v. Government Employees Insurance Co.99 is an illustrative case.
In Ruiz, Hermilinda Quesada de Ruiz (Mrs. Ruiz) was driving her car
in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, which is across the border from El Paso, Texas,
where she lived, when she was injured in an accident.100 She and her
husband reported the accident to their auto insurer, GEICO, which denied
coverage because the accident occurred in Mexico.101 The Ruizes’ policy
with GEICO defined the coverage territory as the United States, including
its territories and possessions, Puerto Rico, and Canada, and further stated:
“This policy also applies to loss to, or accidents involving, your covered auto
while being transported between their ports.”102
The Ruizes sued GEICO in a Texas state court.103 The trial court
awarded GEICO summary judgment and the Ruizes appealed.104 On appeal,
they argued that the policy was ambiguous and could be understood to
provide coverage while it was being transported between United States
ports of entry—five of which were in or near El Paso.105 According to the
Ruizes, the term “ports” in the coverage territory provision could easily
be read to mean that a car would be covered if an insured was traveling
from one United States port of entry to another via Mexico.106 GEICO
countered that “port” as used in its policy did “not mean port of entry.”107

(including its territories and possessions), Puerto Rico, and Canada. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC.,
supra note 1, at 13.
96. Cal. State Auto. Ass’n, Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Super. Ct., 223 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249
(Ct. App. 1986).
97. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Sun Line Helicopters, Inc., 180 So. 2d 364, 365–66 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (involving an airplane that was being flown from Florida to Puerto Rico,
both of which were within the subject insurance policy’s coverage territory).
98. Cal. State Auto., 223 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
99. 4 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. App. 1999).
100. Id. at 840.
101. Id. at 840–41.
102. Id. at 841 (emphasis omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 842.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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The court rejected the Ruizes’ argument because it contradicted the
clear policy language, and it was backed by no authority.108 As the court
summarized the situation:
The territorial limits of the policy are unambiguous. If an accident occurred within
the United States’ boundaries, it would be covered by the policy. If an accident
occurred within the boundaries of Puerto Rico, Canada, or any other United States
territory or possession, it would be covered by the policy. If the automobile were
being transported from the United States to Puerto Rico, or from Miami to the
Port of Houston, and the carrier was sunk during a hurricane, the loss would be
covered by the policy. We find no authority supporting the Ruizes contention
that the language in their policy could be interpreted to mean that their vehicle
would be covered when traveling from one United States port of entry to another
via Mexico.109

The Ruizes also undermined their position by conceding at oral argument
that there would be no coverage for the accident if Mrs. Ruiz used the same
port of entry to both enter Mexico and return to Texas.110 Unfortunately
for them, there was no evidence in the record to indicate which ports of
entry Mrs. Ruiz utilized on the day of the accident.111 As a matter of Texas
civil procedure, if the Ruizes’ interpretation of the policy required passage
through different ports of entry to trigger coverage, it was their burden to
demonstrate that Mrs. Ruiz used different ports of entry on the day of the
accident to create a fact issue that would have precluded summary
judgment for GEICO.112 Without such evidence, and with the policy’s
coverage territory language being clear and unambiguous, the Ruiz court
affirmed the trial court judgment for GEICO.113
The Ruiz court touched on the possible importance of different U.S.
departure and entry ports when evaluating a territorial limitation on coverage,
but it did not have to analyze the issue because of the case’s procedural

108. Id. at 843.
109. Id.; see also Cal. State Auto. Ass’n, Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Super. Ct., 223 Cal.
Rptr. 246, 248–49 (Ct. App. 1986) (concerning a car that entered Mexico at an Arizona
port of entry and was involved in an accident in Mexico before the driver could return to
the U.S. via a California port of entry and explaining why ports of entry are not ports for
coverage territory purposes); Dykeman v. Mission Ins. Co., 471 P.2d 317, 318 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1970) (reaching the same conclusion and further stating that the purpose of driving
the car between two ports of entry via Mexico was to transport the occupants rather than
the car).
110. Ruiz, 4 S.W.3d at 843.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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posture and because of its rejection of the plaintiffs’ claim that a port of
entry for customs purposes is a port in the territorial limitations context.
In Cassingham v. Nationwide General Insurance Co., which involved
a seaport and therefore a port for territorial limitation purposes, the question
was whether coverage for an injury outside the policy’s coverage territory
would lie when the departure and destination ports in the coverage territory
were the same.114 The answer was no.115
In Cassingham, Delaware resident Tamera Cassingham “was injured
while ashore in Bermuda during a vacation cruise.”116 She was riding a
rented moped when she was struck by an unidentified motorcyclist.117 She
sought UM and personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from her auto
insurance carrier, Nationwide.118 Nationwide denied coverage based on the
territorial limitation in its policy, which restricted coverage to “Canada, the
United States of America and its territories or possessions or between their
ports.”119 Cassingham countered that the policy did, in fact, cover her
accident because her cruise started and finished at the port of Philadelphia,
such that it “took place between ports of the United States.”120 Alternatively,
she argued, the “between their ports” language was ambiguous and accordingly
had to be interpreted in line with her “reasonable expectations.”121 She
contended that it was reasonable for her to assume that the Nationwide
policy covered her for injuries incurred in a car wreck anywhere in the world
because Nationwide never told her differently.122
Nationwide responded that the “between their ports” language referred to
travel or transit between different U.S. and Canadian seaports.123 According
to Nationwide, Cassingham’s reading of the territorial limitation provision
was misguided because it would confer coverage on an insured who left a
U.S. port to go anywhere in the world and later returned to a U.S. port,
thus nullifying the territorial limitation.124 Cassingham and Nationwide both
moved for summary judgment.125 The court found no merit in Cassingham’s
argument that the “between their ports” language in her policy extended
coverage to her Bermuda moped accident.126 Her interpretation of the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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No. 90-10-244, 1991 WL 236917, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991).
Id. at *3–5.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the Nationwide insurance policy).
Id. at *2.
Id. (citing Jeanes v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 532 A.2d 595, 599 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
Id.
Id. (including seaports in United States territories and possessions).
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
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territorial limitation would allow an insured to recover for an accident that
occurred anywhere in the world provided that the insured returned to a
Canadian or United States port or to a port in a U.S. territory or possession.127
Such an interpretation would be “illogical” because it would render the
territorial limitation “almost meaningless.”128
The court also rejected Cassingham’s ambiguity claim because the
phrase “between their ports” was not susceptible “to more than one reasonable
interpretation.”129 More particularly, Cassingham’s urged interpretation
of “between their ports” did not create an ambiguity because, although it
was a possible competing construction of the Nationwide policy, it was
an unlikely one rather than a reasonable alternative.130
After disposing of an additional issue, the court denied Cassingham’s
motion for summary judgment and granted Nationwide’s motion.131
The Cassingham court reached the correct result. But, for the sake of
argument and educational purposes, consider two alternative scenarios.
Assume that instead of departing from and returning to Philadelphia,
Cassingham’s ship left Philadelphia bound ultimately for Miami. Would
she have had coverage for her Bermudian moped accident then? Yes—
assuming that the accident was otherwise covered under the Nationwide
policy—because the trip was between different U.S. ports.132 What if the
ship, instead of continuing to Miami, was forced by a storm or mechanical
issues to return to Philadelphia, the same port from which it departed?
Would Cassingham have had coverage in that instance? Again, the answer
is yes because the planned course of the cruise was between different U.S.
ports;133 the fact that severe weather or equipment failure forced the ship

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *4.
131. Id. at *5.
132. See Ruiz v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 4 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex. App. 1999)
(supporting this position by referring to a seafaring trip between the ports of Miami and
Houston).
133. This affirmative answer again depends on the accident being covered under the
Nationwide policy.
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back to Philadelphia should not eliminate coverage.134 To rule otherwise
would, in that rare situation, defeat the parties’ intent.135
In summary, the phrase between their ports in territorial limitations in
standard insurance policies is clear. An insurer’s failure to define the
terms port or ports in its policy does not “render the policy ambiguous.”136
A port is a seaport or other place in a covered country, such as an airport,
from which it is possible to travel on or over international waters, or
through international airspace; U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports
of entry along the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico are not ports in
this context. Absent exceptional circumstances—like the second hypothetical
scenario sketched above—the phrase between their ports requires travel
between different ports in the policy’s coverage territory.
III. TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS ON UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Although courts generally enforce territorial limitations on automobile
insurance coverage, they may not do so where UM coverage is concerned
and the policy at issue imposes a more restrictive territorial limitation on
UM coverage than it does on other coverages or where the state’s UM
statute does not contemplate a territorial limitation.137 In contrast, courts
routinely uphold territorial limitations on UM coverage where the limitations
track those that apply to the policy’s liability coverages or are otherwise
statutorily permissible.138
134. Cf. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Sun Line Helicopters, Inc., 180 So. 2d 364, 365–66 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (involving a plane being flown from Florida to Puerto Rico with a
planned refueling stop in the Bahamas that developed engine trouble and crashed as it
attempted an emergency landing in the Bahamas).
135. See id. at 366 (upholding the trial court’s determination regarding the parties’ intent).
136. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Estate of Stetz, 92 N.E.3d 676, 683 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018) (applying Ohio law and stating “that the failure to define a term in an insurance
policy does not automatically render the policy ambiguous” (citing Fahlbush v. CrumJones, 891 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008))); Gil v. Clara Maas Med. Ctr., 162
A.3d 1093, 1102 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017) (noting that the lack of a definition does
not “‘automatically’ create an ambiguity” (quoting Priest v. Roncone, 851 A.2d 751, 755
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004))).
137. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marquez, 28 P.3d 1132, 1135 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the territorial limitation was void because it sought to impose
greater limitations on the UM coverage than it did on the liability coverage); 7A AM. JUR.
2D Automobile Insurance § 312 (2017) (stating that a UM endorsement cannot “establish
a territorial restriction not contemplated by the applicable uninsured motorist statute”
(citing Mission Ins. Co. v. Brown, 63 Cal.2d 508 (1965))).
138. See, e.g., Boatner v. Atlanta Specialty Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 1248, 1254–58 (5th
Cir. 1997) (interpreting Mississippi law); Guillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
B-05-292, 2006 WL 1295060, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2006) (predicting Nebraska
law); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1164–67 (D. Haw.
2001) (applying Hawaii law); Fazio v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 20, 21, 25–26
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By way of background, UM coverage is a form of first-party coverage.139
With UM coverage, people injured by an uninsured motorist are compensated
by their own auto insurer in an amount equal to what the uninsured
tortfeasor’s liability insurer would have paid if the tortfeasor had carried
liability insurance.140 UM coverage is personal to the insured, so insureds

(Ohio 2005) (concluding that a territorial limitation that restricted UM coverage to the
United States and Canada was valid and, therefore, the insured was not covered for a dune
buggy accident in Mexico, even though liability coverage applied to areas of Mexico; the
insurer offered UM coverage for Mexico in an amount equal to liability coverage); Clark
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 577 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Wis. 1998) (validating the UM
territorial limitation); Degollado v. Gallegos, 917 P.2d 823, 827 (Kan. 1996) (holding that
a policy provision that limited UM coverage to United States and Canada was valid even
though it was not a statutorily-permitted exclusion); Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d
755, 760–61 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the territorial limitation was enforceable); Pollard v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 79, 81 (R.I. 1990) (upholding a territorial limitation that
applied to all aspects of the policy); Heinrich-Grundy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 525 N.E.2d 651,
654 (Mass. 1988) (“[T]he [Massachusetts] [l]egislature did not intend to proscribe territorial
restrictions on [UM] coverage that are coextensive with territorial restrictions on liability
coverage.”); Lovato v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 742 P.2d 1242, 1243–44 (Wash. 1987)
(recognizing a territorial limitation on UM coverage that was coextensive with the policy’s
limitation on liability coverage); Weaver v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., No. L-412-13, 2014 WL
148541, at *1, *4–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 16, 2014) (enforcing a UM policy’s
territorial limitation); Gonzales v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 P.3d 1103, 1106–07 (Colo. App.
2002) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ public policy argument against enforcing a territorial
limitation on UM coverage); Mijes v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., 740 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000) (noting that the territorial limitation was a general provision and finding
that it did not violate Illinois public policy); Dominguez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 942 P.2d
191, 194 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a clear and unambiguous territorial limitation);
Higbee v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 617 So. 2d 51, 56 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“[A territorial]
limitation does not defeat the public policy underlying the [Louisiana] UM statute [and]
[s]uch a restriction is reasonable when the burden on insurance providers is weighed
against the benefits of disallowing the restriction.”); Smith v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 455
N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that territorial limitations on UM
coverage are enforceable); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Myers, 557 A.2d 686, 687–
88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (determining that the territorial limitation on UM
coverage was consistent with the relevant New Jersey statute and distinguishing PIP
benefits); Robles v. Cal. State Auto. Ass’n, 145 Cal. Rptr. 115, 121 (Ct. App. 1978) (seeing
“no statutory or public policy” basis for invalidating a territorial limitation on UM coverage);
Cassingham v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., No. 90-10-244, 1991 WL 236917, at *4 (Del.
Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991) (upholding a territorial limitation).
139. Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 818 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Wis. 2012); Stamper v.
Hyden, 334 S.W.3d 120, 125 n.2 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Coots v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
853 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Ky. 1993)).
140. See Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Mo. 2014)
(en banc) (“The purpose of UM coverage is to take the place of the liability coverage the
insured would have received had he or she been involved in an accident with an insured
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may recover UM benefits if they are hurt while occupying or operating
vehicles other than those identified on their policies.141 UM coverage is
compulsory in many states, meaning each auto liability insurance policy
issued in the state must provide UM coverage.142 In other states, an insurer
must offer UM coverage, but an insured may either reject it or purchase
limits up to those required for liability coverage under the state’s financial
responsibility law.143
Mijes v. Primerica Life Insurance Co. is a characteristic case enforcing
a territorial limitation on UM coverage.144 There, Miguel and Maria Mijes
had an auto policy with Allstate Insurance that provided coverage for an
insured auto in Mexico for up to ten days so long as that auto was within
seventy-five miles of the U.S. border.145 Maria was killed when the rental
car that Miguel was driving was hit by an uninsured vehicle near Mexico
City.146 Allstate denied coverage for the accident, and Miguel sued it for
breach of contract.147 He acknowledged that the accident occurred more
than seventy-five miles from the U.S. border, but he contended that Allstate’s

motorist.” (citing Kuda v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Mo. 1990) (en
banc))); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Willis, 235 So. 3d 1041, 1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2018) (“UM coverage was intended to enable an insured to receive the same recovery that
would have been available had the tortfeasor been covered by an automobile liability
policy that complied with the Financial Responsibility Law (FRL). . . . Stated another way,
UM coverage is intended to provide the reciprocal of liability coverage.” (citations omitted)).
141. See Davis v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 129 So. 3d 811, 815 (La. Ct. App.
2013) (observing that UM coverage follows the insured rather than the vehicle (citing
Howell v. Balboa Ins. Co., 564 So. 2d 298, 301–02 (La. 1990))); Ferguson, 134 F. Supp.
2d at 1163 (explaining that UM coverage is “personal to the insured” and, consequently,
“an insured under a UM policy is entitled to recover UM insurance benefits even though
he or she was injured while operating a vehicle not covered by the policy . . . or while
occupying a vehicle not declared in the policy” (citations omitted)(first citing Dawes v.
First Ins. Co. of Haw., 883 P.2d 38, 44 (Haw. 1994); and then citing Palisbo v. Hawaiian
Ins. & Guar. Co., 547 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Haw. 1976)).
142. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(a) (2018) (requiring UM coverage); MO.
REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (2018) (mandating UM coverage).
143. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(a)(1) (2015) (“The insurer and any named
insured . . . may, by agreement in writing . . . (1) delete the provision covering damage
caused by an uninsured motor vehicle completely, or (2) delete the coverage when a motor
vehicle is operated by a natural person or persons designated by name, or (3) agree to
provide the coverage in an amount less than that required by subdivision (m) but not less
than the financial responsibility requirements specified in . . . the Vehicle Code.”); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 431:10C-301(d)(2) (2018) (“An insurer shall offer the insured the opportunity to
purchase uninsured motorist coverage . . . by offering . . . [t]he option to select uninsured
motorist coverage and underinsured motorist coverage, whichever is applicable, up to but
not greater than the bodily injury liability coverage limits in the insured’s policy.”).
144. 740 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
145. Id. at 1164 (quoting the Allstate policy).
146. Id. at 1162.
147. Id. at 1163.
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territorial limitation was void because it violated Illinois public policy.148
His argument hinged on the Illinois Insurance Code’s requirement that all
auto policies provide UM coverage at the limits established for liability
coverage by the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law.149
Allstate won summary judgment in the trial court, and Miguel appealed.150
His theory of liability presented an issue of first impression for the Mijes
court.151 The court began its analysis by noting that the “overwhelming
weight of authority holds [that] territorial limitations are valid if they apply
equally to statutorily mandated uninsured motorist and liability coverages.”152
Unfortunately for Miguel, the Illinois financial responsibility law never
mentioned Mexico; in fact, it defined a statutorily mandated motor vehicle
liability policy as one which provided coverage in the United States and
Canada.153
The territorial limitation in the Allstate policy was located in the policy’s
general provisions and applied to all coverages.154 The UM coverage was
therefore “coextensive with [the] liability coverage” as required by Illinois
statutes.155 Because Illinois statutes did not mandate liability coverage in
Mexico, it did not matter that the Allstate policy provided only limited
UM coverage for accidents occurring there.156 Miguel’s public policy
argument failed as a result, and the Mijes court affirmed summary judgment
for Allstate.157
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Marquez158 supplies
the opposing perspective. In that case, Librada Marquez was injured when
the car in which she was a passenger was stuck by an uninsured motorist
on a road between Juarez and Palomas, Mexico.159 Marquez’s policy with
State Farm expressly limited UM coverage to the United States, including
its territories and possessions, and Canada.160 In comparison, the policy’s
148. Id. at 1164.
149. Id. at 1164–65 (citing 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/143a (1998)).
150. Id. at 1161.
151. Id. at 1164.
152. Id. (citing numerous cases from various jurisdictions).
153. Id. at 1165 (quoting 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-317 (1998)).
154. Id. (citing Milwaukee Guardian Ins., Inc. v. Taraska, 602 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (noting “valid reasons to recognize territorial limitations” on UM coverage).
158. See generally 28 P.3d 1132 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
159. Id. at 1133.
160. Id. (quoting the State Farm policy).
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liability, medical payments, and physical damage coverages applied to
accidents in Mexico within fifty miles of the U.S. border.161 State Farm
acknowledged that Marquez’s accident occurred within fifty miles of the
border, but it denied coverage based on the territorial limitation governing
the policy’s UM coverage.162
State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action and obtained summary
judgment in the trial court.163 The trial court rejected Marquez’s argument
in her cross-motion for summary judgment that New Mexico public policy
demanded that liability and UM coverage be territorially coextensive.164
Marquez appealed her loss to the New Mexico Court of Appeals.165
Marquez’s appeal presented the court with the opportunity to answer a
question left open in an earlier case, Dominguez v. Dairyland Insurance
Co., in which the court held that territorial limitations on UM coverage
are valid when they apply to the policy as a whole.166 In the Marquez case,
however, the contested territorial limitation undoubtedly applied only to
UM benefits.167
The Marquez court began its analysis with the language of the New
Mexico UM statute, which provided:
No automobile liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed
by law arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall
be delivered or issued for delivery in New Mexico with respect to any motor
vehicle registered or principally garaged in New Mexico unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto in minimum limits . . . and such higher
limits as may be desired by the insured, but up to the limits of liability specified
in bodily injury and property damage liability provisions of the insured’s policy,
for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.168

The statute aims to restore injured policyholders to the position they would
have occupied if the uninsured motorist instead had liability insurance.169
Because the UM statute is remedial, courts interpret it liberally to promote
its objectives.170 “In light of these rules of statutory construction,” the
court concluded that the New Mexico legislature meant “for uninsured
motorist coverage to apply in the same amounts and in the same territory
161. Id. (quoting the territorial limitation in the State Farm policy).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See generally 942 P.2d 191 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
167. Marquez, 28 P.3d at 1132.
168. Id. at 1133 (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN § 66-5-301 (1983)).
169. Id. at 1133–34 (citing Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 100,
102 (N.M. 1975)).
170. Id. at 1134 (citing Romero v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 243, 245 (N.M. 1990)).
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as a particular policy provides for liability coverage.”171 Inasmuch as the
UM statute was intended to protect an insured just as if the tortfeasor
carried liability insurance, and that the amount of UM coverage depended
on the amount of liability coverage, the court further concluded “that the
legislature also intended that the geographical scope of uninsured motorist
coverage depends on and must be equal to the scope of liability coverage.”172
In sum, the Marquez court found that New Mexico public policy required
UM coverage to be “territorially coextensive with liability coverage.”173
Because that was not the situation in this case, the UM territorial limitation
was void.174 As a result, the Marquez court reversed the district court order
in favor of State Farm and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.175 Quite simply, Marquez won.
IV. TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS AND THE CREATION OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER INSURERS
Finally, in addition to the coverage issues that territorial limitations create,
these provisions may subject insurers to personal jurisdiction in courts that
are seemingly outside the insurers’ spheres of operation. Indeed, insurers’
exposure to personal jurisdiction predicated on coverage territory provisions
in their policies is a recurring source of controversy.
To explain, although states typically have long-arm statutes that
govern when a nonresident defendant may be sued in the state, courts’
ability to exercise personal jurisdiction is nonetheless limited by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.176 In its canonical decision in International
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1135.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1136.
176. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017)
(observing that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state courts’ personal jurisdiction); see
also Trois v. Apple Tree Auction Ctr., Inc., 882 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2018) (reciting
that in a diversity case, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must satisfy both federal due
process requirements and the state’s long-arm statute; where the long-arm statute “extends
to the limits of federal constitutional due process, only one inquiry is required” (first citing
Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 445 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2006); and then citing
Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999)); Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d
549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017) (“As a procedural matter, federal courts look to state law in
determining the bounds of their jurisdiction . . . . The Illinois long-arm statute permits the
court to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Thus, the state statutory and federal constitutional requirements
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Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant
has “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’”177 A defendant has sufficient minimum contacts when its “conduct
and connection with the forum [s]tate are such that [it] should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.”178 The existence of minimum
contacts is a case- and fact-specific question.179
Once a defendant’s minimum contacts are established, the “court considers
those contacts ‘in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion
of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial
justice.’”180 In evaluating whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports
with notions of fair play and substantial justice—that is, whether it is
reasonable181—courts consider
(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interest in resolving the
dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving convenient and effective relief,
(4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental social policies.182

merge.” (citations omitted) (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); then citing 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-209(c) (2018); and then citing Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700
(7th Cir. 2010))).
177. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
178. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
179. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1287
(10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2004));
Baker v. LivaNova PLC, 210 F. Supp. 3d 642, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485 (1985)).
180. Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also
Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 908 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Even
if a plaintiff has met its burden of establishing minimum contacts, ‘we must still inquire
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’” (quoting Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir.
2011))).
181. See Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 331 (2d Cir. 2016)
(explaining that the reasonableness inquiry asks “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’
[on the facts] of the particular case” (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126
(2014)); TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1287 (stating that the fair play and substantial justice
aspect of a personal jurisdiction inquiry pivots on “whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction is ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances” (quoting OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal
Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998)).
182. Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 909 (quoting Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distrib., Inc.,
428 F.3d 1270, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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Chief among these factors is “the burden on the defendant.”183
Continuing, personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.184
For a corporation, “the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction” is the place in which it “is fairly regarded as at home.”185
Specific jurisdiction is different; for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, the litigation must arise out of, or relate to,
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. 186 A court’s specific
jurisdiction is therefore restricted to the adjudication of issues that are
connected to or derived from “the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction.”187 Absent such linkage, specific jurisdiction is lacking
regardless of the defendant’s unrelated activities in the state.188
Where an insurance policy includes a state within its coverage territory,
courts frequently hold that the insurer purposely availed itself of the
benefits and privileges of conducting business in the state and thus established
the minimum contacts necessary for specific personal jurisdiction.189 The
183. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
184. Id. at 1779–80; In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 888 F.3d 753, 778 (5th Cir.
2018).
185. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
186. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127).
187. Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
188. Id. at 1781 (“For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with
the forum are not enough.”).
189. See, e.g., TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 488 F.3d
1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]nsurers establish minimum contacts with a forum state
by affirmatively choosing to include the forum state in the territory of coverage.”); Ferrell
v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the nationwide
coverage territory clause in the West Bend policy established sufficient minimum contacts
with Arkansas to satisfy due process); McGow v. McCurry, 412 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th
Cir. 2005) (agreeing with other courts that an insurer’s coverage territory clause constitutes
purposeful availment for personal jurisdiction reasons); Payne v. Motorists’ Mut. Ins.
Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The fact that Motorists’ chose to provide coverage
for all fifty states—indeed, such coverage is almost certainly the only kind of marketable
auto insurance—constitutes purposeful availment of any individual state’s forum.”);
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990)
(reasoning that the defendant insurance company “satisfied the purposeful availment
requirement [because its] coverage extend[ed] into Montana and an insured event resulted
in litigation there”); Evanston Ins. Co. v. W. Cmty. Ins. Co., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1070
(D. Nev. 2014) (reasoning that by defining its coverage territory as the “United States of
America (including its territories and possessions),” Western Community Insurance
purposely availed itself of the benefits of conducting business in Nevada and ultimately
was subject to personal jurisdiction there); Forshaw Indus., Inc. v. Insurco, Ltd., 2 F. Supp.
3d 772, 782 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (“A foreign insurance company’s promise to defend its
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question then becomes whether the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the insurer would “offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice”190—that is, whether it is reasonable.191 As with the
determination of minimum contacts, this is a case- and fact-specific inquiry.192

policyholders from any claim arising from a loss or accident within the forum state is a
sufficient contact to support jurisdiction.”); Melvin v. Farm Bureau Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. CIV-14-927-R, 2014 WL 12730319, at *2–3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 5, 2014) (reasoning
that the insurer availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Oklahoma by
including the state in its coverage territory); Robinson Corp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 304
F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237–39 (D. Haw. 2003) (finding that the insurer purposefully availed
itself of Hawaii and that the litigation would not have arisen but for the insurer’s contacts
with Hawaii); Samelko v. Kingstone Ins. Co., 184 A.3d 741, 754 (Conn. 2018) (finding
personal jurisdiction in Connecticut where the policy provided nationwide coverage and
obligated the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured); Auto Owners Ins. Co. v.
Consumers Ins. USA, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 781, 784–86 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that
the defendant subjected itself to personal jurisdiction in Kentucky through its coverage
territory provision); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 645
N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (reasoning that Tennessee Farmers’ coverage
territory provision provided minimum contacts). But see Maxitrate Tratemento Termico
E Controles v. Super Sys., Inc., No. 12-3807, 2015 WL 3407370, at *3 (6th Cir. May 28,
2015) (concluding that a Brazilian insurer’s decision to insure property in Brazil was not
purposeful activity in Ohio even though the insured did considerable business in Ohio);
Lexington Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. (Taiwan) Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 3d 982, 990 (W.D. Wis.
2017) (declining to exercise personal jurisdiction; although the insurer might have
expected to have to defend its insured in Wisconsin as a result of its worldwide territorial
coverage, it would not have expected to litigate coverage in the state); Odeh v. Auto Club
Ins. Ass’n, No. 1:09 CV 1114, 2010 WL 319742, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2010) (finding
no personal jurisdiction in Ohio where the accident occurred in Michigan, notwithstanding
a nationwide territory of coverage clause); Meyer v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 492 So. 2d
1314, 1315–16 (Fla. 1986) (concluding that the insurer’s identification of its coverage
territory to include Florida did not support personal jurisdiction there); Waste Mgmt., Inc.
v. Admiral Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 379, 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“[I]n the absence
of a forum-related event, a ‘territory of coverage’ clause alone does not create a sufficient
basis on which to rest jurisdiction in this state.”).
190. Int’l Shoe v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
191. See, e.g., Evanston Ins., 13 F. Supp. 3d at 1071–72 (concluding that the
defending insurer failed to carry its burden of rebutting the reasonableness of personal
jurisdiction in Nevada); Melvin, 2014 WL 12730319, at *3–5 (determining that the insurer
had not shown that the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was unreasonable under a
five-factor test); Robinson Corp., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1239–42 (applying a seven-factor test
in deciding that specific personal jurisdiction was reasonable); State Farm, 645 N.W.2d at
174 (citing a five-factor test in concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was
reasonable). But see, e.g., Satterfield v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1285,
1294–96 (W.D. Okla. 2018) (declining to exercise personal jurisdiction on this basis);
Delta Stone Prods. v. Xpertfreight, No. 2:16-cv-369-CW-EJF, 2017 WL 3491845, at *6–
9 (D. Utah Aug. 14, 2017) (exercising personal jurisdiction over the insurer would be
unreasonable under the circumstances).
192. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292.
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TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd., which
was decided by the Tenth Circuit in 2007, is currently the leading case on
personal jurisdiction arising out of an insurer’s coverage territory
provision.193 Plaintiff T.H. Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC (THAN) was a
Delaware liability company with its principal place of business in Kansas.194
THAN was a second-tier subsidiary of a Dutch corporation, Koninklijke
Philips Electronics N.V. (Philips).195 The defendants were thirteen European
insurance companies, which issued primary and excess liability insurance
policies to Philips as part of its “World–Wide Liability Insurance Programme”
(Programme).196 A Dutch insurance broker placed the Programme policies
with the participating insurers, and the insurers “issued the policies to
Philips in the Netherlands.”197 The Programme afforded “worldwide . . .
coverage to Philips . . . and its unnamed direct and indirect subsidiaries.”198
The Programme insured THAN as one of Philips’s indirect subsidiaries.199
The insurers reserved the right to control any litigation against the
insureds that their policies covered, prevented the insureds from settling
covered claims without the insurers’ consent, and granted the insurers the
right to use the insureds’ names in pursuing litigation for the insurers’
benefit.200 The policies also included a provision which provided that any
dispute between the parties would be litigated in the Netherlands, and
Dutch law would control the outcome.201
For years, THAN’s predecessor company, Thompson Hayward, which
also was a Philips subsidiary, distributed asbestos.202 Asbestos is a wellknown carcinogen.203 THAN’s primary function was to satisfy Thompson

193. See generally id.
194. Id. at 1285.
195. Id. (explaining that THAN was a subsidiary of Philips Electronics North America
Corp., which was, in turn, a subsidiary of Philips).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1285–86.
201. Id. at 1286.
202. Id.
203. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“Asbestos is a toxic material, and occupational exposure to asbestos dust can result in
mesothelioma, asbestosis, and lung cancer.”); Decker Plastics, Inc. v. W. Bend Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 1:14-cv-15-CFB, 2017 WL 2196898, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 12, 2017) (“Asbestos
is a carcinogen that is subject to significant state and federal regulation.” (citing U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ill. 1991)).
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Hayward’s existing liabilities and remediate its environmental liabilities.204
As a result of Thompson Hayward’s toxic business practices, THAN had
been named as a defendant in more than 14,000 bodily injury and
wrongful death claims in state and federal courts across the country.205
One such claim was filed in Kansas, that is, THAN’s principal place of
business.206
The Programme insurers contended that Philips had not disclosed its
asbestos liabilities during their negotiations, and all but one of them joined
in a declaratory judgment (DJ) action in the Netherlands in an effort to
rescind their policies.207 When the insurance companies further declined
to defend or indemnify THAN in connection with the Kansas asbestos
claim, THAN sued them for breach of contract in the District of Kansas.208
The district court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
insurers would be unreasonable.209 THAN appealed that decision.
The TH Agriculture court explained that its jurisdictional inquiry
required it to ask whether the insurers had minimum contacts with Kansas,
and, if so, whether the district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction
over them would “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’”210 The fair play and substantial justice component of the inquiry
pivots on whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable in a
particular case.211 In any event, the two components are interrelated,
so, depending on the strength of a defendant’s minimum contacts with
the forum state, the reasonableness component “may have a greater or
lesser effect on the outcome of the due process inquiry.”212 In other words,
the due process reasonableness “inquiry evokes a sliding scale: the weaker
the plaintiff’s showing on minimum contacts, the less the defendant need
show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction.”213
In considering whether the insurers had minimum contacts with Kansas
by virtue of their purposeful direction of their activities at Kansans, such
that they should reasonably expect to be haled into a Kansas court, the
court noted that the insurance policies on which THAN predicated its

204. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1286.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Grp. Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1054,
1068–73 (D. Kan. 2006), aff’d, 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2007).
210. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1287 (quoting OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins.
Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998)).
211. Id. (quoting OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091).
212. Id. (quoting OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091–92).
213. Id. (quoting OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1092).
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minimum contacts argument had to have “a substantial connection with
Kansas”;214 the mere fact that THAN had contracts with the insurers was
not enough.215 Given that all the dealings between the insurers and Philips—
and thus THAN—took place in Europe, the only possible connection
between the insurers and THAN came from the worldwide coverage
territory provisions in the insurance policies.216 As the court would go on
to explain, however, “the issuance of an insurance policy that” provided
worldwide coverage and granted the insurer “an option to defend the
insured [sufficed] to establish minimum contacts with” Kansas.217
The court reasoned that the policy provisions giving the insurers control
of defense and settlement and empowering them to litigate in the insureds’
names plainly contemplated the insurers’ participation in foreign litigation.218
Although the foreseeability of litigation in a given forum, standing alone,
is normally insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, it may be a factor to consider in some cases. 219 In fact,
“[f]orseeability that an event may occur over which a defendant has no
control is distinct from [the] foreseeability of litigation based on the
defendant’s own actions.”220 More particularly:
When an insurer includes a broad territory-of-coverage clause in an insurance
policy, the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states is based on the insurer’s
own actions. . . . Although litigation involving the insurer’s participation may be
merely foreseeable, the fact that the insurer purposefully bargains and contracts
for that participation creates contacts with the forum states within the scope of
the policy’s territory of coverage. In other words, the insurer’s “willingness to
be called into court in the foreign forum” is “an express feature of its policy.”
....
We acknowledge that we have expressed concern that, when courts focus on
an insurance policy’s scope of coverage, they base jurisdiction on what a
defendant-insurer does not do, that is, its failure to exclude the forum state from
coverage. . . . We are not, however, suggesting that insurers establish minimum
contacts with a forum state by failing to exclude it from the covered territory.
214. Id. at 1288 (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
215. See id. at 1287 (“An individual’s contract with an out-of-state party cannot,
standing alone, establish sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.” (citing Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985))).
216. See id. at 1288.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1289.
219. Id. at 1289–90 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 295–98 (1980)).
220. Id. at 1290 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
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Rather, insurers establish minimum contacts with a forum state by affirmatively
choosing to include the forum state in the territory of coverage. That is, insurers
quite clearly avail themselves of the privilege of conducting business in a forum
state when that state is included in an insurance policy’s territory of coverage.221

Here, the insurers’ minimum contacts with Kansas were obviously based
on their affirmative conduct: they included the state in their policies’
coverage territory.222 This was no accident; the insurers consciously chose
their policies’ scope of coverage.223 In sum, by reserving the right to
defend and indemnify Philips and its subsidiaries within their policies’
coverage territory, the insurers had “purposefully availed themselves of
the privileges and benefits of conducting business in any forum state
within” that territory.224 Consequently, the insurers had established minimum
contacts with Kansas.225 At the same time, those contacts were “relatively
weak.”226
The court easily found that THAN’s claims arose out of the insurers’
contacts with Kansas, as was additionally required for specific jurisdiction.227
After all, THAN was seeking coverage under insurance policies that included
Kansas in the coverage territory and that gave the insurers the right to
control litigation involving covered claims, and at least one of the underlying
asbestos claims for which THAN sought coverage was filed in Kansas.228
The TH Agriculture court next examined whether it would be reasonable
for the district court to assume personal jurisdiction over the insurers.229
Because, as noted earlier, the insurers’ minimum contacts with Kansas were
weak, they did not have to “make a strong showing of unreasonableness.”230
Five factors would be in play: (1) the burden imposed on the insurers by
litigating in Kansas; (2) Kansas’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3)
THAN’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the
interstate judicial system’s interest in efficiently resolving the dispute; and

221. Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
832 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); and then citing OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co.
of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998)).
222. Id. at 1291.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (“Sole reliance on the territory of coverage clause creates contacts which are
qualitatively low on the due process scale.” (citing OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1095)).
227. See id. at 1291–92 (citing OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1095).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1292.
230. Id.
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(5) the states’ shared interest in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.231
First, with respect to the burden on the insurers, it was certainly true
that because they were located in Europe, litigating a case in Kansas
would burden them to some degree.232 As THAN pointed out, however,
modern means of communication and transportation have lessened the
burden of litigating in a remote forum.233 Plus, as the district court had
noted, the insurers were global companies that were routinely involved in
litigation across the United States.234 But, although modern communication
and transportation advances would lessen the insurers’ burden in litigating
in Kansas, they were not so weighty as “to tip the scales in favor of exercising
jurisdiction.”235 This factor was a draw.236
The second factor—the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute—was also neutral.237 Although Kansas had an interest in seeing
that its citizens received insurance proceeds for which they bargained, this
interest was offset by the fact that Dutch law would control the resolution
of the parties’ dispute.238
With respect to the third factor, that being THAN’s interest in convenient
and effective relief, THAN could obtain such relief in the Dutch DJ
action.239 Indeed, THAN’s breach of contract action and the Dutch DJ
action involved the same issues.240 For that matter, “THAN [wa]s less likely
to receive convenient and effective relief if it litigate[d] the same” issues
in different forums because of the potential for inconsistent results.241
Additionally, there was no sign that THAN’s burden of litigating its
breach of contract case in the Netherlands would be “so overwhelming as
to practically foreclose pursuit of the lawsuit.”242 Although THAN argued
that the vast majority of the documents and witnesses necessary to try its

231. Id. (quoting Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Sols., Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1249
(10th Cir. 2000)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1293 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1293–94.
238. Id. (citing Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1079 (10th Cir. 2004)).
239. Id. at 1294.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1295.
242. Id.
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breach of contract case were in Kansas, in fact, many key documents and
witnesses were in the Netherlands.243 Long story short, this factor cut
against the recognition of personal jurisdiction in Kansas.244
The court next evaluated the fourth factor, which was the interstate judicial
system’s interest in efficiently resolving the dispute.245 The outcome of this
inquiry rests on the location of witnesses, where the underlying wrong
occurred, what forum’s substantive law controls the dispute, and whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction is required to avoid piecemeal
litigation.246
THAN repeated the same claims it made in arguing that Kansas provided
the best forum for it to obtain convenient and effective relief, and the court
similarly shot them down.247 Furthermore, at least two other considerations
compelled the conclusion that Kansas was not the proper forum for this
case. First, Dutch law would govern the dispute.248 Second, in light of
the pending DJ action in the Netherlands, litigating THAN’s breach of
contract case in Kansas would actually create or further piecemeal litigation
rather than avoiding it.249 On balance, then, the fourth factor weighed against
vesting jurisdiction in Kansas.250
Finally, the court focused on the fifth factor, which required it to determine
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction by Kansas would affect other
states’ or countries’ substantive social policy interests.251 The court concluded
that exercising personal jurisdiction in Kansas would intrude on Dutch
sovereignty.252 In doing so, the court analogized to an earlier case involving
Canadian insurers:
Exercising personal jurisdiction in Kansas would affect the policy interests of
Canada. Defendants are Canadian corporations. They entered into insurance
contracts in Canada, with Plaintiff’s Canadian parent company. The contracts are
governed by Canadian law. Moreover, when jurisdiction is exercised over a foreign
citizen regarding a contract entered into in the foreign country, the country’s
sovereign interest in interpreting its laws and resolving disputes involving its
citizens is implicated.253

243. Id. at 1295–96.
244. Id. at 1296.
245. Id.
246. Id. (quoting OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1097
(10th Cir. 1998)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1297.
251. Id. (quoting OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1097).
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1098).
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Although the insurance companies in TH Agriculture opted to deal with
THAN by insuring Philips’s subsidiaries as part of the Programme, five
of the carriers were domiciled in the Netherlands, none of the remaining
insurers were based in Kansas, and Dutch law would govern the case.254
Overall, the fifth factor counseled against exercising jurisdiction in Kansas.255
In conclusion, three of the five reasonableness factors weighed against
asserting personal jurisdiction over the insurers in Kansas, and the remaining
two factors were neutral.256 The Tenth Circuit accordingly decided that
exercising jurisdiction over the insurers would offend “traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”257 It affirmed the district court’s
ruling and dismissed THAN’s appeal.258
There should be little doubt that the TH Agriculture court reached the
right result, but it is worth asking whether it sufficiently analyzed the first
reasonableness factor, meaning the burden imposed on the insurers by
requiring them to litigate in Kansas. In concluding that, on balance, this factor
favored neither side, the court did not noticeably consider the fact that key
documents and witnesses were located in Europe;259 it merely observed
that litigating in Kansas would subject the insurers to “some burden.”260
Nor did the court consider the importance of Dutch law and Dutch
jurisdiction in connection with this factor—although it did weigh them in
the insurers’ favor later.261 In fact, while THAN felt the effect of the
insurers’ coverage denial in Kansas, its breach of contract case for practical
purposes rested in the Netherlands or elsewhere in Europe; that is, where
the great majority of the critical documents and witnesses necessarily had to
be. The modern communication and travel options that THAN argued
lightened the burden of producing those documents or making those
witnesses available for deposition or trial still come at a cost, much of
which would have been borne by the insurers.262 The importance of Dutch

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1297–98.
258. Id. at 1298.
259. See id. at 1292–93, 1295–96 (analyzing the burden on the insurers and discussing
the locations of relevant documents and witnesses).
260. Id. at 1292.
261. See id. at 1292–97.
262. But see Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1083 (D. Haw. 2014)
(requiring inconvenience to a defendant “so great as to constitute a deprivation of due
process” to defeat personal jurisdiction and noting the improvements in communication
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law and jurisdiction cannot be overstated inasmuch as THAN was a
subsidiary of a Dutch parent, Philips, and obtained its insurance through
Philips at no expense to itself and through no Kansas connection.263
Why is getting the burden analysis right so essential? Because now,
perhaps more than ever, the primary concern in personal jurisdiction analysis
is the burden on the defendant.264 And, while assessing the burden on a
defendant “obviously requires a court to consider the practical problems
resulting from litigating in the forum, . . . it also encompasses the more
abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may
have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”265
V. CONCLUSION
In the current global environment, territorial limitations on coverage
remain an important condition in insurance policies. At the same time,
these provisions often escape insureds’ attention until it is too late. They
may also ambush insurers, which periodically become locked in jurisdictional
struggles in states that seemingly have little connection to their normal
business operations or which bear little relation to the risks they thought
they were assuming. For courts, the dearth of coverage territory case law
in many jurisdictions may make analyzing related issues a challenge. In
short, this interesting but frequently overlooked or underappreciated aspect
of insurance law potentially tests everyone concerned.

and transportation that lighten any potential burden on defendants attributable to litigation
in a remote jurisdiction (first quoting Panavision Int’l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1323 (9th Cir. 1998); and then quoting Kukui Gardens Corp. v. Holco Capital Grp., Inc.,
664 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1116 (D. Haw. 2008))).
263. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1288.
264. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
265. Id.
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